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Abstract
This paper presents the design and implementation of
Obladi, the first system to provide ACID transactions
while also hiding access patterns. Obladi uses as its build-
ing block oblivious RAM, but turns the demands of sup-
porting transactions into a performance opportunity. By
executing transactions within epochs and delaying com-
mit decisions until an epoch ends, Obladi reduces the
amortized bandwidth costs of oblivious storage and in-
creases overall system throughput. These performance
gains, combined with new oblivious mechanisms for con-
currency control and recovery, allow Obladi to execute
OLTP workloads with reasonable throughput: it comes
within 5× to 12× of a non-oblivious baseline on the TPC-
C, SmallBank, and FreeHealth applications. Latency over-
heads, however, are higher (70× on TPC-C).
1 Introduction
This paper presents Obladi, the first cloud-based key
value store that supports transactions while hiding ac-
cess patterns from cloud providers. Obladi aims to mit-
igate the fundamental tension between the convenience
of offloading data to the cloud, and the significant pri-
vacy concerns that doing so creates. On the one hand,
cloud services [3, 4, 47, 48, 61] offer clients scalable,
reliable IT solutions and present application develop-
ers with feature-rich environments (transactional sup-
port, stronger consistency guarantees [22, 51], etc.). Med-
ical practices, for instance, increasingly prefer to use
cloud-based software to manage electronic health records
(EHR) [17, 38]. On the other hand, many applications
that could benefit from cloud services store personal data
that can reveal sensitive information even when encrypted
or anonymized [52, 53, 73, 82]. For example, charts ac-
cessed by oncologists can reveal not only whether a pa-
tient has cancer, but also, depending on the frequency of
accesses (e.g., the frequency of chemotherapy appoint-
ments), indicate the cancer’s type and severity. Similarly,
travel agency websites have been suspected of increasing
the price of frequently searched flights [82]. Hiding ac-
cess patterns—that is, hiding not only the content of an
object, but also when and how frequently it is accessed,
is thus often desirable.
Responding to this challenge, the systems commu-
nity has taken a fresh look at private data access. Re-
cent solutions, whether based on private information re-
trieval [2, 30], Oblivious RAM [15, 43, 69], function
sharing [82], or trusted hardware [5, 7, 24, 43, 80], show
that it is possible to support complex SQL queries without
revealing access patterns.
Obladi addresses a complementary issue: supporting
ACID transactions while guaranteeing data access privacy.
This combination raises unique challenges [5], as concur-
rency control mechanisms used to enforce isolation, and
techniques used to enforce atomicity and durability, all
make hiding access patterns more problematic (§3).
Obladi takes as its starting point Oblivious RAM, which
provably hides all access patterns. Existing ORAM imple-
mentations, however, cannot support transactions. First,
they are not fault-tolerant. For security and performance,
they often store data in a client-side stash; durability re-
quires the stash content to be recoverable after a fail-
ure, and preserving privacy demands hiding the stash’s
size and contents, even during failure recovery. Sec-
ond, ORAM provides limited or no support for concur-
rency [12, 69, 74, 85], while transactional systems are
expected to sustain highly concurrent loads.
Obladi demonstrates that the demands of supporting
transactions can not only be met, but also turned into a
performance opportunity. Its key insight is that transac-
tions actually afford more flexibility than the single-value
operations supported by previous ORAMs. For example,
serializability [60] requires that the effects of transactions
be reflected consistently in the state of the database only
after they commit. Obladi leverages this flexibility to delay
committing transactions until the end of fixed-size epochs,
buffering their execution at a trusted proxy and enforcing
consistency and durability only at epoch boundaries. This
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delay improves ORAM throughput without weakening
privacy.
The ethos of delayed visibility is the core that drives
Obladi’s design. First, it allows Obladi to implement a
multiversioned database atop a single-versioned ORAM,
so that read operations proceed without blocking, as with
other multiversioned databases [10], and intermediate
writes are buffered locally: only the last value of any key
modified during an epoch is written back to the ORAM.
Delaying writes reduces the number of ORAM opera-
tions needed to commit a transaction, lowering amortized
CPU and bandwidth costs without increasing contention:
Obladi’s concurrency control ensures that delaying com-
mits does not affect the set of values that transactions
executing within the same epoch can observe.
Second, it allows Obladi to securely parallelize Ring
ORAM [68], the ORAM construction on which it builds.
Obladi pipelines conflicting ORAM operations rather than
processing them sequentially, as existing ORAM imple-
mentations do. This parallelization, however, is only se-
cure if the write-back phase of the ORAM algorithm is
delayed until pre-determined times, namely, epoch bound-
aries.
Finally, delaying visibility gives Obladi the ability to
abort entire epochs in case of failure. Obladi leverages this
flexibility, along with the near-deterministic write-back
algorithm used by Ring ORAM, to drastically reduce the
information that must be logged to guarantee durability
and privacy-preserving crash recovery.
The results of a prototype implementation of Obladi
are promising. On three applications (TPC-C [79], Small-
Bank [21], and FreeHealth [41], a real medical applica-
tion) Obladi is within 5×-12× of the throughput of non-
private baselines. Latency is higher (70×), but remains
reasonable (in the hundreds of milliseconds).
To summarize, this paper makes three contributions:
1. It presents the design, implementation, and evaluation
of the first ACID transactional system that also hides
access patterns.
2. It introduces an epoch-based design that leverages
the flexibility of transactional workloads to increase
overall system throughput and efficiently recover from
failures.
3. It provides the first formal security definition of a trans-
actional, crash-prone, and private database. Obladi
uses the UC-security framework [14], ensuring that
security guarantees hold under concurrency and com-
position.
Obladi also has several limitations. First, like most
ORAMs that regulate the interactions of multiple clients,
it relies on a local centralized proxy, which introduces
issues of fault-tolerance and scalability. Second, Obladi
does not currently support range or complex SQL queries.
Addressing the consistency challenge of maintaining
oblivious indices [5, 24, 88] in the presence of transac-
tions is a promising avenue for future work.
2 Threat and Failure Model
Obladi’s threat and failure assumptions aim to model
deployments similar to those of medical practices, where
doctors and nurses access medical records through an
on-site server, but choose to outsource the integrity and
availability of those records to a cloud storage service [17,
38].
Threat Model. Obladi adopts a trusted proxy threat
model [69, 74, 85]: it assumes multiple mutually-trusting
client applications interacting with a single trusted proxy
in a single shared administrative domain. The applica-
tions issue transactions and the proxy manages their ex-
ecution, sending read and write requests on their behalf
over an asynchronous and unreliable network to an un-
trusted storage server. This server is controlled by an
honest-but-curious adversary that can observe and con-
trol the timing of communication to and from the proxy,
but not the on-site communication between application
clients and the proxy. We extend our threat model to a
fully malicious adversary in Appendix A. We consider
attacks that leak information by exploiting timing channel
vulnerabilities in modern processors [13, 35, 42] to be out
of scope. Obladi guarantees that the adversary will learn
no information about: (i) the decision (commit/abort) of
any ongoing transaction; (ii) the number of operations
in an ongoing transaction; (iii) the type of requests is-
sued to the server; and (iv) the actual data they access.
Obladi does not seek to hide the type of application that
is currently executing (ex: OLTP vs OLAP).
Failure Model. Obladi assumes cloud storage is reli-
able, but, unlike previous ORAMs, explicitly considers
that both application clients and the proxy may fail. These
failures should invalidate neither Obladi’s privacy guaran-
tees nor the Durability and Atomicity of transactions.
3 Towards Private Transactions
Many distributed, disk-based commercial database sys-
tems [8, 19, 57] separate concurrency control logic from
storage management: SQL queries and transactional re-
quests are regulated in a concurrency control unit and
are subsequently converted to simple read-write accesses
to key-value/file system storage. As ORAMs expose a
read-write address space to users, a logical first attempt
at implementing oblivious transactions would simply re-
place the database storage with an arbitrary ORAM. This
black-box approach, however, raises both security con-
cerns (§3.1) and performance/functionality issues (§3.2)
Security guarantees can be compromised by simply en-
forcing the ACID properties. Ensuring Atomicity, Isola-
tion, and Durability imposes additional structure on the
order of individual reads and writes, introducing sources
of information leakage [5, 71] that do not exist in non-
transactional ORAMs (§3.1). Performance and function-
ality, on the other hand, are hampered by the inability of
current ORAMs to efficiently support highly concurrent
loads and guarantee Durability.
3.1 Security for Isolation and Durability
The mechanisms used to guarantee Isolation, Atomicity,
and Durability introduce timing correlations that directly
leak information about the data accessed by ongoing trans-
actions.
Concurrency Control. Pessimistic concurrency con-
trols like two-phase locking [25] delay operations that
would violate serializability: a write operation from trans-
action T1 cannot execute concurrently with any operation
to the same object from transaction T2. Such blocking can
potentially reveal sensitive information about the data,
even when executing on top of a construction that hides
access patterns: a sudden drop in throughput could reveal
the presence of a deadlock, of a write-heavy transaction
blocking the progress of read transactions, or of highly
contended items accessed by many concurrent transac-
tions. More aggressive concurrency control schemes like
timestamp ordering or multiversioned concurrency con-
trol [1, 10, 33, 40, 65, 66, 86] allow transactions to ob-
serve the result of the writes of other ongoing transactions.
These schemes improve performance in contended work-
loads, but introduce the potential for cascading aborts:
if a transaction aborts, all transactions that observed its
write must also abort. If a write-heavy transaction Theavy
aborts, it may cause a large number of transactions to
rollback, again revealing information about Theavy and,
perhaps more problematically, about the set of objects
that Theavy accessed.
Failure Recovery. When recovering from failure, Dura-
bility requires preserving the effects of committed trans-
actions, while Atomicity demands removing any changes
caused by partially-executed transactions. Most commer-
cial systems [49, 57, 58] preserve these properties through
variants of undo and redo logging. To guarantee Durabil-
ity, write and commit operations are written to a redo log
that is replayed after a failure. To guarantee Atomicity,
writes performed by partially-executed transactions are
undone via an undo log, restoring objects to their last
committed state. Unfortunately, this undo process can
leak information: the number of undo operations reveals
the existence of ongoing transactions, their length, and
the number of operations that they performed.
3.2 Performance/functionality limitations
Current ORAMs align poorly with the need of modern
OLTP workloads, which must support large numbers of
concurrent requests; in contrast, most ORAMs admit little
to no concurrency [12, 69, 74, 85] (we benchmark the
performance of sequential Ring ORAM in Figure 10a).
More problematically, ORAMs provide no support for
fault-tolerance. Adding support for Durability presents
two main challenges. First, most ORAMs require the use
of a stash that temporarily buffers objects at the client and
requires that these objects be written out to server storage
in very specific ways (as we describe further in §4). This
process aligns poorly with guaranteeing Durability for
transactions. Consider for example a transaction T1 that
reads the version of object x written by T2 and then writes
object y. To recover the database to a consistent state, the
update to x should be flushed to cloud storage before the
update to y. It may however not be possible to securely
flush x from the stash before y. Second, ORAMs store
metadata at the client to ensure that cloud storage observes
a request pattern that is independent of past and currently
executing operations. As we show in §8, recovering this
metadata after a failure can lead to duplicate accesses that
leak information.
3.3 Introducing Obladi
These challenges motivate the need to co-design the
transactional and recovery logic with the underlying
ORAM data structure. The design should satisfy three
goals: (i) security—the system should not leak access pat-
terns; (ii) correctness—Obladi should guarantee that trans-
actions are serializable; and (iii) performance—Obladi
should scale with the number of clients. The principle of
workload independence underpins Obladi’s security: the
sequence of requests sent to cloud storage shoud remain
independent of the type, number, and access set of the
transactions being executed. Intuitively, we want Obladi’s
sequence of accesses to cloud storage to be statistically
indistinguishable from a sequence that can be generated
by an Obladi simulator with no knowledge of the actual
transactions being run by Obladi. If this condition holds,
then observing Obladi’s accesses cannot reveal to the ad-
versary any information about Obladi’s workload. We
formalize this intuition in our security definition in §9.
Much of Obladi’s novelty lies not in developing new
concurrency control or recovery mechanisms, but in iden-
tifying what standard database techniques can be lever-
aged to lower the costs of ORAM while retaining security,
and what techniques instead subtly break obliviousness.
To preserve workload independence while guaranteeing
good performance in the presence of concurrent requests,
Obladi centers its design around the notion of delayed vis-
ibility. Delayed visibility leverages the observation that,
on the one hand, ACID consistency and Durability apply
only when transactions commit, and, on the other, commit
operations can be delayed. Obladi leverages this flexibil-
ity to delay commit operations until the end of fixed-size
epochs. This approach allows Obladi to (i) amortize the
cost of accessing an ORAM over many concurrently exe-
cuting requests; (ii) recover efficiently from failures; and
(iii) preserve workload independence: the epochs’ deter-
ministic structure allows Obladi to decouple its externally
observable behavior from the specifics of the transactions
being executed.
4 Background
Oblivious Remote Access Memory is a cryptographic
protocol that allows clients to access data outsourced to
an untrusted server without revealing what is being ac-
cessed [28]; it generates a sequence of accesses to the
server that is completely independent of the operations
issued by the client. We focus specifically on tree-based
ORAMs, whose constructions are more efficiently im-
plementable in real systems: to date, they have been
implemented in hardware [26, 45] and as the basis for
blockchain ledgers [15] with reasonable overheads. Most
tree-based ORAMs follow a similar structure: objects
(usually key-value pairs) are mapped to a random leaf (or
path) in a binary tree and physically reside (encrypted) in
some tree node (or bucket) along that path. Objects are
logically removed from the tree and remapped to a new
random path when accessed. These objects are eventually
flushed back to storage (according to their new path) as
part of an eviction phase. Through careful scheduling, this
write-back phase does not reveal the new location of the
objects; objects that cannot be flushed are kept in a small
client-side stash.
Ring ORAM. Obladi builds upon Ring ORAM [68], a
tree-based ORAM with two appealing properties: a con-
stant stash size and a fully deterministic eviction phase.
Obladi leverages these features for efficient failure recov-
ery.
As shown in Figure 1, server storage in Ring ORAM
consists of a binary tree of buckets, each with a fixed
number Z+S of slots. Of these, Z are reserved for stor-
ing actual encrypted data (real objects); the remaining
S exclusively store dummy objects. Dummy objects are
blocks of encrypted but meaningless data that appear in-
distinguishable from real objects; their presence in each
bucket prevent the server from learning how many real
objects the bucket contains and which slots contains them.
A random permutation (stored at the client) determines
the location of dummy slots. In Figure 1, the root bucket
contains a real slot followed by two dummy slots; the real
slot contains the data object a; its left child bucket instead
contains dummy slots in positions one and three, and an
empty real slot in second position.
Client storage, on the other hand, is limited to (i) a con-
stant sized stash, which temporarily buffers objects that
have yet to be replaced into the tree and, unlike a simple
cache, is essential to Ring ORAM’s security guarantees;
(ii) the set of current permutations, which identify the
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Figure 1: Ring ORAM - Read (Z=1, S=2)
role of each slot in each bucket and record which slot
have already been accessed (and marked invalid); and
(iii) a position map, which records the random leaf (or
path) associated with every data object. In Ring ORAM,
objects are mapped to individual leaves of the tree but can
be placed in any one of the buckets along the path from
the root to that leaf. For instance, object a in Figure 1
is mapped to path 4 but stored in the root bucket, while
object b is mapped to path 2 and stored in the leaf bucket
of this path.
Ring ORAM maintains two core invariants. First, each
data object is mapped to a new leaf chosen uniformly
at random after every access, and is stored either in the
stash, or in a bucket on the path from the tree’s root to
that leaf (path invariant). Second, the physical positions
of the Z+S dummy and real objects in each bucket are
randomly permuted with respect to all past and future
writes to that bucket (i.e., no slot can be accessed more
than once between permutations) (bucket invariant). The
server never learns whether the client accesses a real or a
dummy object in the bucket, so the exact position of the
object along that path is never revealed.
Intuitively, the path invariant removes any correlation
between two accesses to the same object (each access
will access independent random paths), while the bucket
invariant prevents the server from learning when an ob-
ject was last accessed (the server cannot distinguish an
access to a real slot from a dummy slot). Together, these
invariants ensure that, regardless of the data or type of
operation, all access patterns will look indistinguishable
from a random set of leaves and slots in buckets.
Access Phase. The procedures for read and write re-
quests is identical. To access an object o, the client first
looks up o’s path in the position map, and then reads one
object from each bucket along that path. It reads o from
the bucket in which it resides and a valid dummy object
from each other bucket, identified using its local permuta-
tion map. Finally, o is remapped to a new path, updated
to a new value (if the request was a write), and added to
the stash; importantly, o is not immediately written back
out to cloud storage.
Figure 1 illustrates the steps involved in reading an
object b, initially mapped to path 2. The client reads a
ab
bc b 1
c 2
a 4a
Read remaining unread  
real objects  into stash
1 2 3 4
Figure 2: Eviction - Read Phase
dummy object from the first two buckets in the path (at
slots two and three respectively), and reads b from the first
slot of the bottom bucket. The three slots accessed by the
client are then marked as invalid in their respective buck-
ets, and b is remapped to path 1. To write a new object c,
the client would have to read three valid dummy objects
from a random path, place c in the stash, and remap it to
a new path.
Access Security. Remapping objects to independent ran-
dom paths prevents the server from detecting repeated
accesses to data, while placing objects in the stash pre-
vents the server from learning the new path. Marking read
slots as invalid forces every bucket access to read from a
distinct slot (each selected according to the random per-
mutation). The server consequently observes uniformly
distributed accesses (without repetition) independently
of the contents of the bucket. This lack of correlation,
combined with the inability to distinguish real slots from
dummy slots, ensures that the server does not learn if or
when a real object is accessed. Accessing dummy slots
from buckets not containing the target object (rather than
real slots), on the other hand, is necessary for efficiency:
in combination with Ring ORAM’s eviction phase (dis-
cussed next) it lets the stash size remain constant by pre-
venting multiple real objects from being addded to the
stash on a single access.
Eviction Phase and Reshuffling. The aforementioned
protocol falls short in two ways. First, if objects are placed
in the stash after each access, the stash will grow un-
bounded. Second, all slots will eventually be marked as
invalid. Ring ORAM sidesteps these issues through two
complementary processes: eviction and bucket reshuffling.
Every A accesses, the evict path operation evicts objects
from the client stash to cloud storage. It deterministically
selects a target path, flushes as much data as possible, and
permutes each bucket in the path, revalidating any invalid
slots. Evict path consists of a read and write phase. In the
read phase, it retrieves Z objects from each bucket in the
path: all remaining valid real objects, plus enough valid
dummies to reach a total of Z objects read. In the write
phase, it places each stashed object—including those read
by the read phase—to the deepest bucket on the target
path that intersects with the object’s assigned path. Evict
b
c
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2
a
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1 2 3 4
b 1
c 2
a 4
Figure 3: Eviction - Write Phase
path then permutes the real and dummy values in each
bucket along the target path, marking their slots as valid,
and writes their contents to server storage. Figure 2 and 3
show the evict path procedure applied to path 4. In the
read phase, evict path reads the unread object a from
the root node and dummies from other buckets on the
path. In the write phase (Fig. 3), a is flushed to leaf 4,
as its path intersects completely with the target path. Fi-
nally, we note that randomness may cause a bucket to
contain only invalid slots before its path is evicted, render-
ing it effectively unaccessible. When this happens, Ring
ORAM restores access to the bucket by performing an
early reshuffle operation that executes the read phase and
write phase of evict path only for the target bucket.
Eviction Security. The read phase leaks no information
about the contents of a given bucket. It systematically
reads exactly Z valid objects from the bucket, selecting
the valid real objects from the z real objects in the bucket,
padding the remaining Z− z required reads with a ran-
dom subset of the S dummy blocks. The random permu-
tation and randomized encryption ensure that the server
learns no information about how many real objects ex-
ist, and how many have been accessed. Similarly, the
write phase hides the values and locations of objects writ-
ten. At every bucket, the storage server observes only a
newly encrypted and permuted set of objects, eliminating
any correlation between past and future accesses to that
bucket. Together, the read and write phases ensure that
no slot is accessed more than once between reshuffles,
guaranteeing the bucket invariant.
Similarly, the eviction process leaks no information
about the paths of the newly evicted objects: since all
paths intersect at the root and the server cannot infer the
contents of any individual bucket, any object in the stash
may be flushed during any evict path. Moreover, since all
paths intersect at the root, any object in the stash may be
flushed during any evict path.
5 System Architecture
Obladi, like most privacy-preserving systems [69, 75, 85]
consists of a centralized trusted component, the proxy, that
communicates with a fault-tolerant but untrusted entity,
cloud storage (Figure 4). The proxy handles concurrency
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Figure 4: System Architecture
control, while the untrusted cloud storage stores the pri-
vate data. Obladi ensures that requests made by the proxy
to the cloud storage over the untrusted network do not
leak information. We assume that the proxy can crash
and that when it does so, its state is lost. This two-tier de-
sign allows applications to run a lightweight proxy locally
and delegate the complexity of fault-tolerance to cloud
storage.
The proxy has two components: (i) a concurrency con-
trol unit and (ii) a data manager comprised of a batch
manager and an ORAM executor. The batch manager peri-
odically schedules fixed-size batches of client operations
that the ORAM executor then executes on a parallel ver-
sion of Ring ORAM’s algorithm. The executor accesses
one of two units located on server storage: the ORAM tree,
which stores the actual data blocks of the ORAM; and the
recovery unit, which logs all non-deterministic accesses
to the ORAM to a write-ahead log [50] to enable secure
failure recovery (§8).
6 Proxy Design
The proxy in Obladi has three goals: guarantee good per-
formance, preserve correctness, and guarantee security.
To meet these goals, Obladi designs the proxy around
the concept of epochs. The proxy partitions time into a
set of fixed-length, non-overlapping epochs. Epochs are
the granularity at which Obladi guarantees durability and
consistency. Each transaction, upon arriving at the proxy,
is assigned to an epoch and clients are notified of whether
a transaction has committed only when the epoch ends.
Until then, Obladi buffers all updates at the proxy.
This flexibility boosts performance in two ways. First, it
allows Obladi to implement a multiversioned concurrency
control (MVCC) algorithm on top of a single versioned
Ring ORAM. MVCC algorithms can significantly im-
prove throughput by allowing read operations to proceed
with limited blocking. These performance gains are espe-
cially significant in the presence of long-running transac-
tions or high storage access latency, as is often the case
for cloud storage systems. Second, it reduces traffic to the
ORAM, as only the database state at the end of the epoch
needs to be written out to cloud storage.
Importantly, Obladi’s choice to enforce consistency and
durability only at epoch boundaries does not affect cor-
rectness; transactions continue to observe a serializable
and recoverable schedule (i.e., committed transactions do
not see writes from aborted transactions).
For transactions executing concurrently within the same
epoch, serializability is guaranteed by concurrency con-
trol; transactions from different epochs are naturally se-
rialized by the order in which the proxy executes their
epochs. No transaction can span multiple epochs; unfin-
ished transactions at epoch boundaries are aborted, so that
no transaction is ongoing during epoch changes.
Durability is instead achieved by enforcing epoch fate-
sharing [81] during proxy or client crashes: Obladi guar-
antees that either all completed transactions (i.e., transac-
tions for which a commit request has been received) in the
epoch are made durable or all transactions abort. This way,
no committed transaction can ever observe non-durable
writes.
Finally, the deterministic pattern of execution that
epochs impose drastistically simplifies the task of guar-
anteeing workload independence: as we describe further
below, the frequency and timing at which requests are
sent to untrusted storage are fixed and consequently inde-
pendent of the workload.
The proxy processes epochs with two modules: the con-
currency control unit (CCU) ensures that execution re-
mains serializable, while the data handler (DH) accesses
the actual data objects. We describe each in turn.
6.1 Concurrency Control
Obladi, like many existing commercial databases [56, 64],
uses multiversioned concurrency control [10]. Obladi
specifically chooses multiversioned timestamp ordering
(MVTSO) [10, 67] because it allows uncommitted writes
to be immediately visible to concurrently executing trans-
actions. To ensure serializability, transactions log the set
of transactions whose uncommitted values they have ob-
served (their write-read dependencies) and abort if any
of their dependencies fail to commit. This optimistic
approach is critical to Obladi’s performance: it allows
transactions within the same epoch to see each other’s ef-
fects even as Obladi delays commits until the epoch ends.
In contrast, a pessimistic protocol like two-phase lock-
ing [25], which precludes transactions from observing un-
committed writes, would artificially increase contention
by holding exclusive write-locks for the duration of an
epoch. When a transaction starts, MVTSO assigns it a
unique timestamp that determines its serialization order. A
write operation creates a new object version marked with
its transaction’s timestamp and inserts it in the version
chain associated with that object. A read operation re-
turns the object’s latest version with a timestamp smaller
than its transaction’s timestamp. Read operations further
update a read marker on the object’s version chain with
their transaction’s timestamp. Any write operation with
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a smaller timestamp that subsequently tries to write to
this object is aborted, ensuring that no read operation ever
fails to observe a write from a transaction that should have
preceded it in the serialization order.
Consider for example the set of transactions executing
in Figure 5. Transaction t1’s update to object a (w(a1))
is immediately observed by transaction t3 (r3(a1)). t3 be-
comes dependent on t1 and can only commit once t1 also
commits. In contrast, t2’s write to object d causes t2 to
abort: a transaction with a higher timestamp (t3) had al-
ready read version d0, setting the version’s read marker
to 3.
6.2 Data Handler
Once a version is selected for reading or writing, the DH
becomes responsible for accessing or modifying the ac-
tual object. Whereas it suffices to guarantee durability and
consistency only at epoch boundaries, security must hold
at all times, posing two key challenges. First, the number
of requests executed in parallel can leak information, e.g.,
data dependencies within the same transaction [11, 69].
Second, transactions may abort (§6.1), requiring their ef-
fects to be rolled back without revealing the existence of
contended objects [5, 71]. To decouple the demands of
these workloads from the timing and set of requests that
it forwards to cloud storage, Obladi leverages the follow-
ing observation: transactions can always be re-organized
so that all reads from cloud storage execute before all
writes [19, 37, 46, 87]. Indeed, while operations within
a transaction may depend on the data returned by a read
from cloud storage, no operation depends on the execu-
tion of a write. Accordingly, Obladi organizes the DH into
a read phase and a write phase: it first reads all necessary
objects from cloud storage, before applying all writes.
Read Phase. Obladi splits each epoch’s read phase into
a fixed set of R fixed-sized read batches (bread) that are for-
warded to the ORAM executor at fixed intervals (∆epoch).
This deterministic structure allows Obladi to execute de-
pendent read operations without revealing the internal
control flow of the epoch’s transactions. Read operations
are assigned to the epoch’s next unfilled read batch. If no
such batch exists, the transaction is aborted. Conversely,
before a batch is forwarded to the ORAM executor, all
remaining empty slots are padded with dummy requests.
Obladi further deduplicates read operations that access the
same key. As we describe in §7, this step is necessary for
security since parallelized batches may leak information
unless requests all access distinct keys [12, 85]. Dedupli-
cating requests also benefits performance by increasing
the number of operations that can be served within a
fixed-size batch.
Write Phase. While transactions execute, Obladi buffers
their write operations into a version cache that maintains
all object versions created by transactions in the epoch.
At the end of an epoch, transactions that have yet to finish
executing (recall that epochs terminate at fixed intervals)
are aborted and their operations are removed. The latest
versions of each object in the version cache according to
the version chain are then aggregated in a fixed-size write
batch (bwrite) that is forwarded to the ORAM executor,
with additional padding if necessary.
This entire process, including write buffering and dedu-
plication, must not violate serializability. The DH guaran-
tees that write buffering respects serializability by directly
serving reads from the version cache for objects modified
in the current epoch. It guarantees serializability in the
presence of duplicate requests by only including the last
write of the version chain in a write batch. Since Obladi’s
epoch-based design guarantees that transactions from a
later epoch are serialized after all transactions from an
earlier epoch, intermediate object versions can be safely
discarded. In this context, MVTSO’s requirement that
transactions observe the latest committed write in the se-
rialization order reduces to transactions reading the tail
of the previous epoch’s version chain.
In the presence of failures, Obladi guarantees serializ-
ability and recoverability by enforcing epoch fate sharing:
either all transactions in an epoch are made durable or
none are. If a failure arises during epoch ei, the system
simply recovers to epoch ei−1, aborting all transactions in
epoch ei. Once again, this flexibility arises from Obladi
delaying commit notifications until epoch boundaries.
Example Execution. We illustrate the batching logic
once again with the help of Figure 5. Transactions t1,t2,t3
first execute read operations. These operations are ag-
gregated into the first read batch of epoch i. The values
returned by these reads are then cached into the ver-
sion cache. t2 then executes a write operation, which
Obladi also buffers into the version cache. When exe-
cuting r2(d0)), t3 reads object d directly from the version
cache (we discuss the security of this step in the next sec-
tion). Similarly, r1(a1) reads the buffered uncommitted
version of a. In contrast, Obladi schedules r1(b0) to exe-
cute as part of the next read batch as b0 is not present in the
version cache. The read batch is then padded to its fixed
bread size and executed. t4 contains no read operations: its
write operations are simply executed and buffered at the
version cache. Obladi then finalizes the epoch by aborting
all transactions (and their dependencies) that have not
yet finished executing: t4 is consequently aborted. Finally,
Obladi aggregates the last version of every update into the
write batch (skipping version c1 of object c for instance,
instead only writing c2), before notifying clients of the
commit decision.
6.3 Reducing Work
Obladi reduces work in two additional ways: it caches
reads within an epoch and allows Ring ORAM to execute
write operations without also executing dummy queries.
While these optimizations may appear straightforward, en-
suring that they maintain workload independence requires
care.
Caching Reads. Ring ORAM maintains a client-side
stash (§4) that stores ORAM blocks until their eviction to
cloud storage. Importantly, a request for a block present in
the stash still triggers a dummy request: a dummy object
is still retrieved from each bucket along its path. While
this access may appear redundant at first, it is in fact
necessary to preserve workload independence: removing
it removes the guarantee that the set of paths that Obladi
requests from cloud storage is uniformly distributed. In
particular, blocks present in the stash are more likely to
be mapped to paths farther away from the one visited
by the last evict path, as they correspond to paths that
could not be flushed: buckets have limited space for real
blocks and blocks mapped to paths that only intersect
near the top of the tree are less likely to find a free slot to
which they can be flushed. The degree to which this effect
skews the distribution leaks information about the stash
size, and, consequently, about the workload. To illustrate,
consider the execution in Figure 6. Objects mapped to
paths 1 and 2 (a, b, and f ) were not flushed from the stash
in the previous eviction of path 4. When these objects
are subsequently accessed, naively reading them from the
stash without performing dummy reads skews the set of
paths accessed toward the right subtree (paths 3 and 4)
Obladi securely mitigates some of this work by draw-
ing a novel distinction between objects that are in the
stash as a result of a logical access and those present
because they could not be evicted. The former can be
safely accessed without performing a dummy read, while
the latter cannot. Objects present in the stash following
a logical access are mapped to independently uniformly
distributed paths. Ring ORAM’s path invariant ensures
that, without caching, the set of accessed paths is uni-
formly distributed. Removing an independent uniform
subset of those paths (namely, the dummy requests) will
consequently not change the distribution. Thus, caching
these objects, and filling out a read batch with other real
or dummy requests, preserves the uniform distribution
of paths and leaks no information. Obladi consequently
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Figure 6: Skew introduced by caching arbitrary objects
allows all read objects to be placed in the version cache
for the duration of the epoch. Objects a, b, d are, for in-
stance, placed in the version cache in Figure 5, allowing
read r2(d0) to read d directly from the cache. In contrast,
objects present in the stash because they could not be
evicted are mapped to paths that skew away from the lat-
est evict path. Caching these objects would consequently
skew the distribution of requests sent to the storage away
from a uniform distribution, as illustrated in Figure 6.
Dummiless Writes. Ring ORAM must hide whether
requests correspond to read or write operations, as the
specific pattern in which these operations are interleaved
can leak information [88]; that is why Ring ORAM exe-
cutes a read operation on the ORAM for every access. In
contrast, since transactions can always perform all reads
before all writes, no information is leaked by informing
the storage server that each epoch consists of a fixed-size
sequence of potentially dummy reads followed by a fixed-
size sequence of potentially dummy writes. Obladi thus
modifies Ring ORAM’s algorithm to directly place the
new version of an object in the stash, without executing
the corresponding read. Note, though, that Obladi contin-
ues to increment the evict path count on write operations,
a necessary step to preserve the bounds on the stash size,
which is important for durability (§8).
6.4 Configuring Obladi
Obladi’s good performance hinges on appropriately con-
figuring the size/frequency of batches and ORAM tree for
a target application. Table 1 summarizes the parameter
space.
Ring ORAM. Configuring Ring ORAM first requires
choosing an appropriate Z parameter. Larger values of
Z reduce the total size of the ORAM on cloud-storage
by decreasing the required height of the ORAM tree and
decrease eviction frequency (reducing network/CPU over-
head). In contrast, this increase the maximum stash size.
Traditional ORAMs thus choose the largest value of Z
for which the stash size fits on the proxy. Obladi adds an
additional consideration: for durability (as we describe
in §8), the stash must be synchronously written out every
epoch. One must thus take into account the throughput
loss associated with the stash writeback time. Given an
appropriate value of Z, Obladi then chooses L, S, and A
according to the analytical model proposed in [68].
N Number of real objects
Z Number of real slots
S Number of dummy slots
A Frequency of evict path
L Number of levels in the ORAM tree
R Number of read batches
bread Size of a read batch
bwrite Size of a write batch
∆ Batch frequency
Table 1: Obladi’s configuration parameters
Epochs and batching. Identifiying the appropriate size
and number of batches hinges on several considera-
tions. First, Obladi must provision sufficiently many read
batches (R) to handle control flow dependencies within
transactions. A transaction that executes in sequence five
dependent read operations, will for instance require five
read batches to execute (it will otherwise repeatedly abort).
Second, the ratio of reads (R ∗ bread) to writes (wwrite)
must closely approximate the application’s read/write ra-
tio. An overly large write batch will waste resources as
it will be padded with many dummy requests. A write
batch that is too small will lead to frequent aborts caused
by the batch filling up. Third, the size of a read or write
batch (respectively bread and bwrite) defines the degree of
parallelism that can be extracted. The desired batch size
is thus a function of the concurrent load of the system, but
also of hardware considerations, as increasing parallelism
beyond an I/O or CPU bottleneck serves no purpose. Fi-
nally, the number and frequency of read batches within
an epoch increases overall latency, but reduces amortized
resource costs through caching and operation pipelining
(introduced in §7). Latency-sensitive applications may
favor smaller batch sizes, while others may prefer longer
epochs, but lower overheads.
Security Considerations. Obladi does not attempt to
hide the size and frequency of batches from the storage
server (we formalize this leakage in §9). Carefully tuning
the size and frequency of batches to best match a given ap-
plication may thus leak information about the application
itself. An OLTP application, for instance, will likely have
larger batch sizes (bread), but fewer read batches (R), as
OLTP applications sustain a high concurrent load of fairly
short transactions. OLAP applications will prefer small
or non-existent write batches (bwrite), as they are predomi-
nantly read-only, but require many read batches to support
the complex joins/aggregates that they implement. Obladi
does not attempt to hide the type of application that is
being run. It does, however, continue to hide what data is
being accessed and what transactions are currently being
run at any given point in time. While Obladi’s configura-
tion parameters may, for instance, suggest that a medical
application like FreeHealth is being run, they do not in
any way leak information about how, when, or which
patient records are being accessed.
7 Parallelizing the ORAM
Existing ORAM constructions make limited use of par-
allelism. Some allow requests to execute concurrently
between eviction or shuffle phases [12, 69, 85], while oth-
ers target intra-request parallelism to speed up execution
of a single request [43]. Obladi explicitly targets both
forms of parallelism. Parallelizing Ring ORAM presents
three challenges: (i) preserving the correct abstraction
of a sequential datastore, (ii) enforcing security by con-
cealing the position of real blocks in the ORAM (thereby
maintaining workload independence), and (iii) preserv-
ing existing bounds on the stash size. While these issues
also arise in prior work [69], the idiosyncrasies of Ring
ORAM add new dimensions to these challenges.
Correctness. Obladi makes two observations. First,
while all operations conflict at the Ring ORAM tree’s root,
they can be split into suboperations that access mostly
disjoint buckets (§4). Second, conflicting bucket oper-
ations can be further parallelized by distinguishing ac-
cesses to the bucket’s metadata from those to its physical
data blocks.
Obladi draws from the theory of multilevel serializabil-
ity [83], which guarantees that an execution is serializable
if the system enforces level-by-level serializability: if op-
eration o is ordered before o′ at level i, all suboperations
of o must precede conflicting suboperations of o′. Thus, if
Obladi orders conflicting operations at a level i, it enforces
the same order at level i+1 for all their conflicting sub-
operations; conversely, if two operations do not conflict
at level i, Obladi executes their suboperations in parallel.
To this end, Obladi simply tracks dependencies across
operations and orders conflicting suboperations accord-
ingly. Obladi extracts further parallelism in two ways.
First, since in Ring ORAM reads to the same bucket
between consecutive eviction or reshuffling operations
always target different physical data blocks (even when
bucket operations conflict on metadata access), Obladi
executes them in parallel. Second, Obladi’s own batching
logic ensures that requests within a batch touch differ-
ent objects, preventing read and write methods from ever
conflicting. Together, these techniques allow Obladi to
execute most requests and evictions in parallel.
We illustrate the dependency tracking logic in Figure 7.
The read operation to path 1 conflicts with the evict path
for path 2, but only at the root (bucket 1). Thus, reads to
buckets 2 and 3 can proceed concurrently, even though
accesses to the root’s metadata must be serialized, as
both operations update the bucket access counter and
valid/invalid map (§4).
Security. For security, Obladi’s parallel evict path oper-
ation must flush the same blocks flushed by a sequential
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Figure 7: Multilevel Pipelining for a read of path 1 and an
evict path of path 2 executing in parallel. Solid green lines
represent physical dependencies and dashed red lines represent
data dependencies. Inner blocks represent nested operations
implementation. Reproducing this behavior without sacri-
ficing parallelism is challenging. It requires that all real
objects brought in during the last A accesses be present
in the stash when data is flushed, which may introduce
data dependencies. Unlike dependencies that arise be-
tween operations that access the same physical location in
cloud storage, these dependencies are not a deterministic
function of an epoch’s operations already known to the
adversary.
Consider, for instance, block b in Figure 7. In a sequen-
tial implementation, b would enter the stash as a result of
reading path 1 and be flushed to bucket 3 by the following
evict path. Thus, evict path would have to wait until b is
placed in the stash. Honoring these dependencies opens
a timing channel: delay in flushing certain blocks can
reveal object placement. As blocks holding real objects
can exist anywhere in the tree and be remapped to any
path, it follows that it is never secure to execute an evic-
tion operation until all previous access operations have
terminated.
Obladi mitigates this restriction by again leveraging de-
layed visibility and the idea to separate read and write
operations within an epoch—but with an important dif-
ference. In §6.2 the proxy created separate batches for
logical read and write operations; to improve parallelism,
Obladi, expanding on an idea used by Shroud [43], as-
signs to separate phases within an epoch the physical read
and write operations that underlie each of those logical
operations. The read phase computes all necessary meta-
data and executes the set of physical read operations for
all logical read path, early reshuffle, and evict path opera-
tions. This set is workload independent, so its operations
need not be delayed. Physical writes, however, are only
flushed at the end of an epoch. The proxy can again apply
write deduplication: if a bucket is repeatedly modified
during an epoch, only the last version must be written
back. Reads that should have read an intermediate write
are served locally from the buffered buckets.
The adversary thus always observes a set of reads to
random paths followed by a deterministic set of writes
independent of the contents of the ORAM and, conse-
quently, of the workload. Data dependencies between
read and evict operations no longer create a timing chan-
nel. Meanwhile parallelism remains high, as the physi-
cal blocks accessed in each phase are guaranteed to be
distinct—Ring ORAM directly guarantees this for reads,
while bucket deduplication does it for writes.
8 Durability
Obladi guarantees durability at the granularity of epochs:
after a crash, it recovers to the state of the last failure-free
epoch. Obladi adds two demands to the need of recovering
to a consistent state: recovery should leak no information
about past or future transactions, and it should be effi-
cient, accessing minimal data from cloud storage. Obladi
guarantees the former by ensuring that recovery logic
and data logged for recovery maintain workload indepen-
dence (§3). It strives towards the latter by leveraging the
determinism of Ring ORAM.
Consistency. Obladi recovery logic relies on two well-
known techniques: write-ahead logging [50] and shadow
paging [29]. Obladi mandates that transactions be durable
only at the end of an epoch; thus, on a proxy failure,
all ongoing transactions can be aborted, and the system
reverted to the previous epoch. To make this possible,
Obladi must (i) recover the proxy metadata lost during
the proxy crash, and (ii) ensure that the ORAM does
not contain any of the aborted transactions’ updates. To
recover the metadata, Obladi logs three data structures
before declaring the epoch committed: the position map,
the permutation map, and the stash. The position map
and the permutation map identify the position of real
objects in the ORAM tree (respectively, in a path and in a
bucket); logging them prevents the recovery logic from
having to scan the full ORAM to recover the position of
buckets. Logging the stash is necessary for correctness.
As eviction may be unable to flush the entire stash, some
newly written buckets may be present only in the stash,
even at epoch boundaries. Failing to log the stash could
thus lead to data loss.
To undo partially executed transactions, Obladi adapts
the traditional copy-on-write technique of shadow pag-
ing [29]: rather than updating buckets in place, it creates
new versions of each bucket on every write. Obladi then
leverages the inherent determinism of Ring ORAM to
reconstruct a consistent snapshot of the ORAM at a given
epoch. In Ring ORAM, the current version of a bucket
(i.e. the number of times a bucket has been written) is a
deterministic function of the number of prior evict paths.
The number of evict paths per epoch is similarly fixed
(evict paths happen every A accesses, and epochs are of
fixed size). Obladi can then trivially revert the ORAM on
failures by setting the evict path counter to its value at
the end of the last committed epoch. This counter deter-
mines the number of evict paths that have occurred, and
consequently the object versions of the corresponding
epoch.
Security. Obladi ensures that (i) the information logged
for durability remains independent of data accesses, and
(ii) that the interactions between the failed epoch, the
recovery logic, and the next epoch preserve workload
independence.
Obladi addresses the first issue by encrypting the posi-
tion map and the contents of the permutations table. It
similarly encrypts the stash, but also pads it to its maxi-
mum size, as determined in canonical Ring ORAM [68],
to prevent it from indicating skew (if a small number of
objects are accessed frequently, the stash will tend to be
smaller).
The second concern requires more care: workload in-
dependence must hold before, during, and after failures.
Ring ORAM guarantees workload independence through
two invariants: the bucket invariant and the path invari-
ant (§4). Preserving bucket slots from being read twice
between evictions is straightforward. Obladi simply logs
the invalid/valid map to track which slots have already
been read and recovers it during recovery; there is no
need for encryption, as the set of slots read is public infor-
mation. Ensuring that the ORAM continues to observe a
uniformly distributed set of paths is instead more challeng-
ing. Specifically, read requests from partially executed
transactions can potentially leak information, even when
recovering to the previous epoch. Traditionally, databases
simply undo partially executed transactions, mark them as
aborted, and proceed as if they had never existed. From a
security standpoint, however, these transactions were still
observed by the adversary, and thus may leak information.
Consider a transaction accessing object a (mapped to path
1) that aborts because of a proxy failure. Upon recovery,
it is likely that a client will attempt to access a again. As
the recovery logic restores the position map of the previ-
ous epoch, that new operation on a will result in another
access to path 1, revealing that the initial access to path
1 was likely real (rather than padded), as the probability
of collisions between two uniformly chosen paths is low.
To mitigate this concern while allowing clients to request
the same objects after failure, Obladi durably logs the list
of paths and slot indices that it accesses, before executing
the actual requests, and replays those paths during recov-
ery (remapping any real blocks). While this process is
similar to traditional database redo logging [50], the goal
is different. Obladi does not try to reapply transactions
(they have all aborted), but instead forces the recovery
logic to be deterministic: the adversary always sees the
paths from the aborted epoch repeated after a failure.
Optimizations. To minimize the overhead of check-
pointing, Obladi checkpoints deltas of the position, per-
mutation, and valid/invalid map, and only periodically
checkpoints the full data structures. While the number
of changes to the permutation and valid/invalid maps di-
rectly follows from the set of physical requests made
to cloud storage, the size of the delta for the position
map reveals how many real requests were included in
an epoch—padded requests do not lead to position map
updates. Obladi thus pads the map delta to the maximum
number of entries that could have changed in an epoch
(i.e., the read batch size times the number of read batches,
plus the size of the single write batch).
9 System Security
We now outline Obladi’s security guarantees, deferring
a formal treatment to Appendix B. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to formalize the notion of
crashes in the context of oblivious RAM.
Model We express our security proof within the Uni-
versal Composability (UC) framework [14], as it aligns
well with the needs of modern distributed systems: a UC-
secure system remains UC-secure under concurrency or
if composed with other UC-secure systems. Intuitively,
proving security in the UC model proceeds as follows.
First, we specify an ideal functionality F that defines the
expected functionality of the protocol for both correct-
ness and security. For instance, Obladi requires that the
execution be serializable, and that only the frequency of
read and write batches be learned. We must ensure that
the real protocol provides the same functionality to honest
parties while leaking no more information than F would.
To establish this, we consider two different worlds: one
where the real protocol interacts with an adversary A,
and one where F interacts with SA, our best attempt at
simulating A. A’s transcript—including its inputs, out-
puts, and randomness—and SA’s output are given to an
environment E , which can also observe all communica-
tions within each world. E’s goal is to determine which
world contains the real protocol. To prompt the worlds
to diverge, E can delay and reorder messages, and even
control external inputs (potentially causing failures). In-
tuitively, E represents anything external to the protocol,
such as concurrently executing systems. We say that the
real protocol is secure if, for any adversary A, we can
construct SA such that E can never distinguish between
the worlds.
Assumptions The security of Obladi relies on four as-
sumptions. (i) Canonical Ring ORAM is linearizable
(ii) MVTSO generates serializable executions. (iii) The
network will retransmit dropped packets. The adversary
learns of the retransmissions, but nothing more.
Ideal Functionality To define the ideal functionality
FOb, recall that the proxy is considered trusted while
interactions with the cloud storage are not. This allows
FOb to replace the proxy and intermediate between clients
and the storage server, performing the same functions as
the proxy (we do not try to hide the concurrency/batching
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logic). We must, however, define FOb to obliviously hide
data values and access patterns. To this end, when the
proxy logic finalizes a batch, FOb simply informs the
storage server that it is executing a read or write batch.
Since FOb is a theoretical ideal, we allow it to manage all
storage internally, so it then updates its local storage and
furnishes the appropriate response to each client.
In this setup, modeling proxy crashes is straightforward.
Crashes can occur at any time and cause the proxy to lose
all state. So, on an external input to crash, FOb simply
clears its state. Since we accept thatA may learn of proxy
crashes, FOb also sends a message to the storage server
that it has crashed.
Proof Sketch The correctness of the system is straight-
forward, as FOb behaves much the same as the proxy.
To prove security, we must demonstrate that, for any
algorithm A defining the behavior of the storage server,
we can accurately simulate A’s behavior using only the
information provided by FOb. Note that the simulator
SA can run A internally, as A is simply an algorithm.
Thus we can define SA to operate as follows. When SA
receives notification of a batch, it constructs a parallel
ORAM batch from uniformly random accesses of the
correct type. It provides these accesses toA and produces
A’s response.
The security of this simulation hinges on two key proper-
ties: (i) the caching and deduplication logic do not affect
the distribution of physical accesses, and (ii) the physical
access pattern of a parallelized batch is entirely deter-
mined by the physical accesses proscribed by sequen-
tial Ring ORAM for the same batch. The first follows
from Ring ORAM’s guarantee that each access will be
an independent uniformly random path—removing an
independently-sampled element does not change the dis-
tribution of the remaining set. The second follows from
the parallelization procedure simply aggregating all ac-
cesses and performing all reads followed by all writes.
These properties ensure that the random access pattern
produced by SA is identical to the access pattern pro-
duced by the proxy when operating on real data. Thus
the simulated A must behave exactly as it would when
provided with real data, and produce indistinguishable
output.
10 Implementation
Our prototype consists of 41,000 lines of Java code.
We use the Netty library for network communication
(v4.1.20), Google protobuffers for serialization (v3.5.1),
the Bouncy Castle library (v1.59) for encryption, and the
Java MapDB library (v3) for persistence. We additionally
implement a non-private baseline (NoPriv). NoPriv shares
the same concurrency control logic (TSO), but replaces
the proxy data handler with non-private remote storage.
NoPriv neither batches nor delays operations; it buffers
writes at the local proxy until commit, and serves writes
locally when possible.
11 Evaluation
Obladi leverages the flexibility of transactional commits
to mitigate the overheads of ORAM. To quantify the ben-
efits and limitations of this approach, we ask:
1. How much does Obladi pay for privacy? (§11.1)
2. How do epochs affect these overheads? (§11.2)
3. Can Obladi recover efficiently from failures? (§11.3)
Experimental Setup The proxy runs on a c5.xlarge
Amazon EC2 instance (16 vCPUs, 32GB RAM), and
the storage on an m5.4xlarge instance (16 vCPUs, 64GB
RAM). The ORAM tree is configured with Z = 100 and
optimal values of S and A (respectively, 196 and 168) [68].
We report the average of three 90 seconds runs (30 sec-
onds ramp-up/down).
Benchmarks We evaluate the performance of our sys-
tem using three applications: TPC-C [21, 79], Small-
Bank [21], and FreeHealth [27, 41]. Our microbench-
marks use the YCSB [18] workload generator. TPC-C,
the defacto standard for OLTP workloads, simulates the
business logic of e-commerce suppliers. We configure
TPC-C to run with 10 warehouses [86]. In line with prior
transactional key-value stores [78], we use a separate ta-
ble as a secondary index on the order table to locate
a customer’s latest order in the order status transac-
tion, and on the customer table to look up customers by
their last names (order status and payment). Small-
bank [21] models a simple banking application support-
ing money transfers, withdrawals, and deposits. We con-
figure it to run with one million accounts. Finally, we
port FreeHealth [27, 41], an actively-used cloud EHR
system (Figure 8). FreeHealth supports the business logic
of medical practices and hospitals. It consists of 21 trans-
action types that doctors use to create patients and look
up medical history, prescriptions, and drug interactions.
11.1 End-to-end Performance
Figure 9 summarizes the results from running the three
end-to-end applications in two setups: a local setup in
which the latency between proxy and server is low (0.3ms)
(Obladi, NoPriv), and a more realistic WAN setup with
10ms latency (ObladiW, NoPrivW). We additionally
compare those results with a local MySQL setup. MySQL,
unlike NoPriv, cannot buffer writes. We consequently do
not evaluate MySQL in the WAN setting.
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TPC-C Obladi comes within 8× of NoPriv’s throughput,
as NoPriv is contention-bottlenecked on the high rate of
conflicts between the new-order and payment transac-
tions on the district table. NoPriv’s performance is
itself slightly higher than MySQL as the use of MVTSO
allows for the new-order and payment transactions to be
pipelined. In contrast, MySQL acquires exclusive locks
for the duration of the transactions. Latency, however,
spikes to 70× over NoPriv because of the inflexible exe-
cution pattern Obladi needs for security. Transactions in
TPC-C vary heavily in size. Epochs must be large enough
to accommodate all transactions, and hence artificially in-
crease the latency of short instances. Moreover, write op-
erations must be applied atomically during epoch changes.
For a write batch size of 2,000, this process takes on av-
erage 340ms, further increasing latency for individual
transactions. The write-back process also limits through-
put, even preventing non-conflicting operations from mak-
ing progress (in contrast, NoPriv can benefit from writes
never blocking reads in MVTSO). Epoch changes also
introduce additional aborts for transactions that straddle
epochs. The additional 10ms latency of the WAN setting
has comparatively little effect, as the large write batch size
of TPC-C is the primary bottleneck: throughput remains
within 9x of NoPrivW. Also NoPrivW’s performance does
not degrade: since MVTSO exposes uncommitted writes
immediately, increasing commit latency does not increase
contention.
Smallbank Transactions in Smallbank are more homo-
geneous (between three and six operations); thus, the
length of an epoch can be set to more closely approximate
most transactions, reducing latency overheads (17× No-
Priv). NoPriv is CPU bottlenecked for Smallbank; the rel-
ative throughput drop for Obladi is higher (12×) because
of the overhead of changing epochs and the blocking
that it introduces. Transaction dependency tracking be-
comes a bottleneck in NoPriv, resulting in a 15% through-
put loss over MySQL. Increasing latency between proxy
and storage causes both systems’ throughput to drop.
ObladiW’s 35% drop is due to the increased duration
of epoch changes (during which no other transactions
can execute) while NoPrivW’s 30% drop stems from the
larger dependency chains that arise from the relatively
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Figure 10: Performance impact of various features
long commit phase.
FreeHealth Like SmallBank, FreeHealth consists of
fairly short transactions and can thus choose a fairly small
epoch (five read batches), reducing the impact on latency
(20× NoPriv). Unlike Smallbank, however, FreeHealth
consists primarily of read operations, and so it can choose
a much smaller write batch (200), minimizing the cost
of epoch changes and maximizing throughput (only a 4×
drop over NoPriv and a 5.5× over NoPrivW for ObladiW).
Both NoPriv and Obladi are contention-bottlenecked on
the creation of episodes, the core units of EHR systems
that encapsulate prescriptions, medical history, and pa-
tient interaction.
11.2 Impact of Epochs
Though epochs create blocking and cause aborts, they
are key to reducing the cost of accessing ORAM, as they
allow to (i) securely parallelize the ORAM and (ii) delay
and buffer bucket writes. To quantify epochs’ impact on
performance as a function of their size and the underlying
storage properties, we instantiate an ORAM with 100K
objects and choose three different storage backends: a lo-
cal dummy (storing no real data) that responds to all reads
with a static value and ignores writes (dummy); a remote
server backend with an in-memory hashmap (server,
ping time 0.3ms) and a remote WAN server backend with
an in-memory hashmap (server WAN, ping time 10ms);
and DynamoDB (dynamo, provisioned for 80K req/s, read
ping 1ms, write 3ms).
Parallelization We first focus on the performance im-
pact of parallelizing Ring ORAM (ignoring other opti-
mizations). Graph 10a shows that, unsurprisingly, the
benefits of parallelism increase with the latency of indi-
vidual requests. Parallelizing the ORAM for dummy, for
instance, yields no performance gain; in fact, it results in
a 3× slowdown (from 72K req/s to 24K req/s). Sequen-
tial Ring ORAM on dummy is CPU-bound on metadata
computation (remapping paths, shuffling buckets, etc.),
so adding coordination mechanisms to guarantee multi-
level serializability only increases the cost of accessing
a bucket. As storage access latency increases and the
ORAM becomes I/O-bound, the benefits of parallelism
become more salient. For a batch size of 500, throughput
increases by 12× for server, as much as 51× for dynamo,
and 510×for WAN server. The available parallelism is a
function of both the size/fan-out of the tree and the un-
derlying resource bottlenecks of the proxy. Graph 10b
captures the parallelization speedup for both intra- and
inter-request parallelism, while Graph 10b quantifies the
latency impact of batching. The parallelization speedup
achieved for a batch size of one captures intra-request
parallelism: the eleven levels of the ORAM can be ac-
cessed concurrently, yielding an 11× speedup. As batch
sizes increase, Obladi can leverage inter-request paral-
lelism to process non-conflicting physical operations in
parallel, with little to no impact on latency. Dynamo peaks
early (at 1750 req/s) because its client API uses blocking
HTTP calls, and dummy’s storage eventually bottlenecks
on encryption, but server and WAN server are more in-
teresting. Their throughput is limited by the physical and
data dependencies on the upper levels of the tree (recall
that paths always conflict at the root (§7)).
Work Reduction To amortize ORAM overheads across
a large number of operations, Obladi relies on delayed
visibility to buffer bucket writes until the end of an epoch,
when they can be executed in parallel, discarding interme-
diate writes. Reads to those buckets are directly served
from the proxy, reducing network communication and
CPU work (as encryption is not needed). Graph 10d
shows that enabling this optimization for an epoch of
eight batches (a setup suitable for FreeHealth and TPC-C)
yields a 1.5× speedup on both dynamo and the server, a
1.6× speedup on the WAN server, but only minimal gains
for dummy (1.1×). When using a small number of batches,
throughput gains come primarily from combining dupli-
cate operations in buckets near the top of the tree. For
example, the root bucket is written 27 times in an epoch of
size eight (once per eviction, every 168 requests). As these
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Figure 11: Durability
operations conflict, they must be executed sequentially
and quickly become the bottleneck (other buckets have
fewer operations to execute). Our optimization lets Obladi
write the root bucket only once, significantly reducing la-
tency and thus increasing throughput. As epochs grow in
size, increasingly many buckets are buffered locally until
the end of the epoch (§7), allowing reads to be served lo-
cally and further reducing I/O with the storage. Consider
Graph 10e: throughput increases almost logarithmically;
metadata computation eventually becomes a bottleneck
for dummy, while server and server WAN eventually
run out of memory from storing most of the tree (our
AWS account did not allow us to provision dynamo ade-
quately for larger batches). Larger epochs reduce the raw
amount of work per operation: with one batch, Obladi
requires 41 physical requests per logical operation, but
only requires 24 operations with eight batches. For real
transactional workloads, however, epochs are not a silver
bullet. Graph 10f suggests that applications are very sensi-
tive to identifying the right epoch duration: too short and
transactions cannot make progress, repeatedly aborting;
too long and the system will remain unnecessarily idle.
11.3 Durability
Table 11b quantifies the efficiency of failure recovery and
the cost it imposes on normal execution for ORAMS of
different sizes (we show space results for only the WAN
server as Dynamo follows a similar trend). During normal
execution, durability imposes a moderate throughput drop
(from 0.83× for 10K to 0.89× for 1M). This slowdown
is due to the need to checkpoint client metadata and to
synchronously log read paths to durable storage before
reading. As seen in Graph 11a, computing diffs mitigates
the impact of checkpointing. Recovery time similarly in-
creases as the ORAM grows, from 1.5s to 6.1s (Table 11b,
RecTime). The costs of decrypting the position and permu-
tation maps (Pos and Perm) are low for small datasets, but
grow linearly with the number of keys. Read path logging
(Paths) instead starts much larger, but grows only with
the depth of the tree.
12 Related Work
Batching Obladi amortizes ORAM costs by grouping op-
erations into epochs and committing at epoch boundaries.
Batching can mitigate expensive security primitives, e.g.,
it reduces server-side computation in private information
retrieval (PIR) schemes [9, 30, 32, 44], amortizes the cost
of shuffling networks in Atom [39] and the cost of verify-
ing integrity in Concerto [6]. Changing when operations
output commit is a popular performance-boosting tech-
nique: it yields significant gains for state-machine repli-
cation [34, 36, 63], file systems [54], and transactional
databases [20, 46, 81].
ORAM parallelism Obladi extends recent work on par-
allel ORAM constructions [11, 43, 85] to extract par-
allelism both within and across requests. Shroud [43]
targets intra-request parallelism by concurrently access-
ing different levels of tree-based ORAMs. Chung et
al [12] and PrivateFS [85] instead target inter-request
parallelism, respectively in tree-based [72] and hierarchi-
cal [84] ORAMs. Both works execute requests to distinct
logical keys concurrently between reshuffles or evictions
and deduplicate concurrent requests for the same key to
increase parallelism. Obladi leverages delayed visibility
to separate batches into read and write phases, extracting
concurrency both within requests and across evictions.
Furthermore, Obladi parallelizes across requests by dedu-
plicating requests at the trusted proxy.
ObliviStore [76] and Taostore [69] instead approach par-
allelization by focusing on asynchrony. ObliviStore [76]
formalizes the security challenges of scheduling requests
asynchronously; the oblivious scheduling mechanism that
it presents for that model however is computationally
expensive and requires a large stash, making ObliviS-
tore unsuitable for implementing ACID transactions. Like
ObliviStore, Taostore leverages asynchrony to parallelize
Path ORAM [77], a tree-based construction from which
Ring ORAM descends. Taostore, however, targets a dif-
ferent threat model: it assumes both that requests must be
processed immediately, and that the timing of responses is
visible to the adversary. Request latencies thus necessarily
increase linearly with the number of clients [85].
Hiding access patterns for non-transactional sys-
tems Many systems seek to provide access pattern pro-
tections for analytical queries: Opaque [88] and Ci-
pherbase [5] support oblivious operators for queries that
scan or shuffle full tables. Both rely on hardware en-
claves for efficiency: Opaque runs a query optimizer
in SGX [31], while Cipherbase leverages secure co-
processors to evaluate predicates more efficiently. Others
seek to hide the parameters of the query rather than the
query itself: Olumofin et al. [55] do it via multiple rounds
of keyword-based PIR operations [16]; Splinter [82] re-
duces the number of round-trips necessary by mapping
these database queries to function secret sharing primi-
tives. Finally, ObliDB [24] adds support for point queries
and efficient updates by designing an oblivious B-tree for
indexing. The concurrency control and recovery mecha-
nisms of all these approaches introduce timing channels
and structure writes in ways that leak access patterns [5].
Encryption Many commercial systems offer the pos-
sibility to store encrypted data [23, 70]. Efficiently ex-
ecuting data-dependent queries like joins, filters, or ag-
gregations without knowledge of the plaintext is chal-
lenging: systems like CryptDB [62], Monomi [80], and
Seabed [59] tailor encryption schemes to allow executing
certain queries directly on encrypted data. Others leverage
trusted hardware [7]. In contrast, executing transactions
on encrypted data is straightforward: neither concurrency
control nor recovery requires knowledge of the plaintext
data.
13 Conclusion
This paper presents Obladi, a system that, for the first time,
considers the security challenges of providing ACID trans-
actions without revealing access patterns. Obladi guaran-
tees security and durability at moderate cost through a
simple observation: transactional guarantees are only re-
quired to hold for committed transactions. By delaying
commits until the end of epochs, Obladi inches closer to
providing practical oblivious ACID transactions.
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A Ensuring Data Integrity in Obladi
As we described in §3, we assume the untrusted storage
server is honest-but-curious. In many cases this is a very
strong assumption that system operators may not be happy
to make. We can remove this requirement with the use
of Message Authentication Codes (MACs) and a trusted
counter—used to ensure freshness—that persists across
crashes. We describe this technique here.
When we assumed the server was honest-but-curious,
we assumed it could deny service, but would otherwise
correctly respond to all queries. In order to remove this
assumption while maintaining security, we must create a
means to identify if the storage server returns incorrect
data, thus reducing them to DoS attacks. To do this, the
proxy must verify that the returned value is the value (i)
most recently written (ii) by the proxy (iii) to the specified
location.
We can guarantee (ii) using MACs. At initialization, the
proxy generates a secret MAC key (in addition to its secret
encryption key) and attaches a MAC to every piece of
data it stores on the cloud server. This allows the proxy
to verify that the cloud server did not modify the data or
manufacture its own.
By themselves, MACs do not guarantee (i) and (iii),
as the cloud server can provide an old copy of the data
or valid data from a different location, both of which
will have valid MACs. We additionally need to include a
unique identifier that the proxy can easily recompute. For
data that is written at most once per epoch, this unique
identifier can be the pair of epoch, ORAM location. Due
to Ring ORAM’s deterministic eviction algorithm, the
proxy can compute the epoch during which any given
block was most recently written knowing only the current
epoch counter and the early reshuffle table.
There is exactly one value which is written multiple
times per epoch: each read batch, of which there may be
many per epoch, logs the accessed locations. This means
the counter associated with those writes must uniquely
identify the read batch, not just the epoch. In fact, since
every epoch has the same number of read batches, a read
batch counter is sufficient for all values.
Handling Crashes The above modifications are suffi-
cient to guarantee integrity if the proxy never crashes.
When the proxy crashes, however, it needs informa-
tion from the cloud storage to recover. To guarantee
integrity—in particular freshness—of the recovery data,
the epoch/read batch counter we describe above must per-
sist in a trustworthy fashion across failures. Perhaps the
easiest way to implement this requirement is to store the
counter on a small amount of nonvolatile storage locally
on the proxy, but any trustworthy and persistent storage
mechanism is sufficient.
This, of course, raises the question of when to update this
trustworthy persistent counter. Once the update occurs, a
recovering proxy will expect the cloud storage to provide
data associated with that counter value. This means that
the counter must be updated after writing to cloud stor-
age. Because a recovering proxy will be unaware of the
newly-written data until the counter is updated, we do not
consider the write complete until the counter is properly
updated. As usual, if the proxy crashes while a write is
in-progress, the write is simply rolled back.
As long as the storage server cannot learn anything from
incomplete writes, our new strategy is entirely secure.
Because the timing of Obladi’s writes is completely deter-
ministic and their locations are determined entirely by the
locations of prior reads, the fact that a write has aborted
does not inherently leak any information. The contents
of the write can, however, leak information if we are not
careful. Most data in the system is already encrypted, but
one value is not: the read logs written during read batches.
Previously we had no need to encrypt these as the write
operation was atomic and the cloud server was to imme-
diately learn all data contained in the write. However, the
write is no longer atomic; the proxy can crash after send-
ing data to the cloud server but before updating its trusted
counter. In this case the storage server may withhold that
data on recovery without detection and learn whether the
proxy accessed the same locations after recovery is com-
plete. To fix this leak, we encrypt the read batch logs in
the cloud and update the counter after writing the log but
before reading any values. That way the cloud storage
gains no information about what data will be read until
after the write is complete, at which point the proxy will
always replay the read if a crash occurs. Thus we have
removed the leakage.
As we will see in Appendix B, these modifications are
sufficient to guarantee both confidentiality and integrity
(though obviously not availability) even against an arbi-
trarily malicious cloud storage server.
B Formal Security
We now provide formal security definitions and proofs
for Obladi. As we discuss in §9, we use the Universal
Composability (UC) framework [14]. The UC framework
requires us to specify an ideal functionality FOb that de-
fines what it means for Obladi to be secure. We must
then prove that, for every possible adversarial algorithm
A specifying the behavior of the storage server, we can
simulate A’s behavior when interacting only with FOb.
We prove security of the scheme including the modifica-
tion in Appendix A and do not assume the cloud storage
provider is trusted for integrity. As the MACs and coun-
ters are only used to verify integrity and freshness of data,
they are unnecessary if the cloud server is being honest.
As we will see below, removing them—as we do in our
implementation—does not impact security in this case.
We also noted in Appendix A that the proxy requires a
trusted epoch counter that persists across crashes. This
could be implemented as an integer in local non-volatile
storage that the proxy updates with each epoch, it could
be implemented by trusting the cloud storage for integrity
and saving it there, or other means. We abstract away this
detail by providing the Obladi protocol with access to
Fepc, an ideal functionality that provides access to this
counter.
B.1 Ideal Functionality
We begin by noting that Obladi’s proxy acts as a trusted
central coordinator that performs publicly-known logic
on private data. As this is essentially the role played by
any ideal functionality, we simply subsume the proxy
into FOb. Moreover, some of the proxy’s behavior, like
the fact that it deduplicates and caches accesses, pads
under-full batches, is public information, meaning FOb
can explicitly perform exactly the same operations.
In §5 we describe the proxy as consisting of a concur-
rency control unit and a data manager, which itself con-
tains a batch manager and ORAM executor. As the con-
currency control and batch management functionalities
do not inherently leak any information, we define FOb
in terms of those operations. In particular, we let F∗Proxy
represent this functionality. F∗Proxy is defined as providing
the exact functionality of the concurrency control unit and
batch manager as described in §5 and §6. F∗Proxy has the
following ways to interface with FOb:
• FOb can supply F∗Proxy with an input from a client (start,
read, write, or commit).
• F∗Proxy can produce a read batch of logical data blocks.
The batch need not be full, meaning it may contain
fewer than the maximum number of reads for a batch.
FOb can then respond with the requested blocks.
• F∗Proxy can produce a write batch of logical data blocks.
The batch need not be full. FOb can then respond con-
firming the writes have completed.
• F∗Proxy can specify an epoch has ended and transactions
should commit. FOb can then respond with confirma-
tion.
• FOb can clear F∗Proxy’s internal state, representing a
crash.
F∗Proxy can additionally send a messages directly to clients.
Modeling Crashes In the real system the proxy can
crash at any time. As all state except the cryptographic
keys (and possibly trusted counters) is considered volatile,
it does not matter when during a local operation the proxy
crashes, as every piece of that operation is lost regardless.
We can therefore simplify the ideal functionality by allow-
ing for crashes both between requests and immediately
prior to any operation within a request that either leaves
the proxy (e.g., writing to cloud storage) or persists across
crashes (e.g., updating the trusted epoch counter).
To model any possible crash, we control the timing of
the crashes through a Crash Client. FOb queries the Crash
Client immediately prior to any relevant action and waits
for a reply. The Crash Client then waits for a prompt from
the environment, which it forwards to FOb, telling it to
proceed or crash. Additionally, the Crash Client—again
at the prompting of the environment—can issue a “crash”
command independently between requests.
We provide the full specification for FOb in Algorithm 1,
which references F∗Proxy. For notational clarity, we do not
explicitly specify every call to the Crash Client. Instead
any operation prefixed by † notifies the Crash Client be-
fore executing and crashes if instructed. Note that it is
possible to crash while recovering from a crash.
B.2 Security Lemmas
In order to prove the security of Obladi, we rely on two
lemmas which we alluded to in §9.
Lemma 1 (Caching and Deduplication). Let D be any
set of logical reads or writes selected independently from
the current ORAM position map. Let D∗ be the set of ac-
cesses resulting from applying the proxy batch manager’s
caching and deduplication logic to D. The set of physical
accesses needed to realize D∗ is identically distributed to
the set of physical accesses needed to realize a uniformly
random set of logical accesses of the same size.
Proof. Since D is selected independently from the cur-
rent position map in the ORAM, Ring ORAM guarantees
that the set of physical accesses needed to realize D is
Algorithm 1: Ideal functionality FOb using F∗Proxy.
Data: D = DatabaseState
Data: Counters ce = 0 ; cb = 0
Initialize
Initialize F∗Proxy
Begin epoch
end
On receive m from client C
Forward (m,C) to F∗Proxy
end
On receive “read-batch[blks]” from F∗Proxy
†Send “read-batch-init” to A, wait for “OK”
†cb← cb+1
†Send “read-batch-read” to A, wait for “OK”
Read blks from D
Respond to F∗Proxy with results
end
On receive “write-epoch[data]” from F∗Proxy
†Send “write-epoch” to A, wait for “OK”
†ce← ce+1 ; cb← 0
Write data to D
Confirm write/epoch completed to F∗Proxy
end
On receive “crash” from Crash Client
Execute crashRecover
end
function crashRecover
Send (“crash”,ce,cb) to A
Clear internal state of F∗Proxy
Rollback writes to D since beginning of epoch ce
†ce← ce+1 ; cb← 0
end
†Before executing operation, notify Crash Client. On response of “crash,”
abort operation and invoke crashRecover, otherwise proceed.
identically distributed to that for a uniformly random set
of logical reads or writes. D∗ is simply D with some ele-
ments removed, so we claim that the elements removed
form an unbiased sample. Since removing an unbiased
sample from a distribution does not change the distribu-
tion, this is sufficient.
We first note that Ring ORAM guarantees that any
independently-selected logical access d results in physical
accesses sampled independently from the following distri-
bution. First sample a uniformly random path in the tree.
Then, for each bucket in that path, sample a uniformly
random block from among those not read since the bucket
was last written. Finally, read all selected blocks.
In Ring ORAM, whenever a block is read or written, it
is immediately remapped to an independent uniformly
random path in the tree that determines what will be
read next time it is accessed. The proxy batch manger’s
caching and deduplication logic removes access requests
for any block previously accessed in this epoch. Each of
those blocks was mapped to a new independently uniform
random path when accessed. Moreover, when an epoch
ends, the cache is completely flushed, meaning there is
no (potentially-biased) caching or deduplication.
Thus the sample of physical accesses removed by pairing
D down to D∗ must be unbiased, so D∗ must result in a
uniformly random set of physical access paths.
Lemma 2 (Parallel ORAM). The set of parallel physical
data operations performed by the proxy ORAM executor
over one epoch (as described in §7) is completely deter-
mined by the set of sequential physical accesses required
to perform the same logical actions in Ring ORAM (plus
a single write to the durability store).
Proof. We note that, as described in §7, the proxy per-
forms all reads within an epoch before any writes (aside
from the durability store). By construction, it ensures that
each physical block that would be read at least once within
an epoch in a fully sequential access is read exactly once
in that epoch, and no other physical blocks are ever read
(excluding crash recovery).
This is enforced by holding a record of every block that
has been read this epoch and then performing the reads
of the sequential access, but skipping blocks that have
already been read. Additionally, whenever an evict path
operation would happen, the proxy reads every unread
block from each bucket along that path, thus marking
them as read. As the timing of evict paths is determined
by how many data accesses have happened and their lo-
cations are deterministic, this enforcement mechanism is
dependent only on the physical blocks accessed, not in
any way on the data held in those blocks.
Similarly, each block that would be written at least once
in a sequentially-processed epoch is written exactly once
at the end of the epoch. This is done by buffering writes
in the proxy, allowing one buffered write of a physical
block to overwrite any previous unflushed writes of that
block. Then when the epoch ends, the proxy flushes all
buffered writes. Again, the set of blocks being written is
determined entirely by the physical access pattern of the
sequential operation.
Finally, a fixed amount of data is written to the durability
store before each read batch, and the entire durability store
is written with each write batch. This means that in normal
operation, the location and timing of all reads and writes
are determined by only the physical operations needed to
perform the epoch operations sequentially and some extra
completely deterministic operations.
On crash recovery, the proxy reads the durability store
and rereads all paths in the aborted epoch. This, again, is
based entirely on physical access patterns.
Hence all physical read and write operations within a
parallelized epoch are determined entirely by the physical
data operations needed to perform that epoch sequentially.
B.3 Proof of Security
We now prove that the Obladi protocol ΠOb (with access
to Fepc) is secure with respect to the ideal functional-
ity described in Algorithm 1. Let RealA,E(λ ) denote the
full transcript of A (including its inputs and randomness)
when interacting with ΠOb. Let IdealS,E(λ ) denote the
transcript produced by S when run in the ideal world,
interacting with FOb.
Theorem 1. Assume the encryption scheme used in ΠOb
is semantically secure and the MACs are existentially
unforgeable. For all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversaries A and environments E , there is a simulator
SA such that for all PPT distinguishers D there is some
negligible function negl such that∣∣∣Pr[D(RealA,E(λ ))= 1]
−Pr
[
D
(
IdealSA,E(λ )
)
= 1
]∣∣∣≤ negl(λ ).
Proof. This proof follows from a series of hybrid simula-
tors, each of which is indistinguishable from the previous.
We define hybrids H0, . . . ,H4. H0 operates in the real
world with S0 being a “dummy” that passes all messages
through to A unmodified. H1 has two ORAMs that are
identical except for the MACs, one maintained by A and
the other maintained by S1. H2 replaces all data in A’s
ORAM with random dummy data, independent from the
actual data. H3 replaces the access pattern in A’s ORAM
with random data accesses. Finally H4 uses SA in the
ideal world and no longer maintains its own ORAM.
Hybrid H0 contains a dummy simulator that passes mes-
sages betweenA and the proxy unchanged. This produces
a transcript identical to the real world.
Hybrid H1 passes all messages through to A, but also
maintains its own copy of the ORAM, simultaneously
processes requests internally. On initialization S1 gener-
ates its own MAC key according to the same distribution
as ΠOb’s MAC key. It then replaces the MACs of all data
sent to A with valid MACs on the same data using this
new key. When A responds to a request, S1 checks the
MACs on the data. If they are correct, it forwards the
(correct) response from it’s own ORAM with the original
MACs. If they are incorrect, it responds with a failure
message. If A’s response is correct, so too will S1’s. If
A’s MACs to not verify, ΠOb fails, so a failure message
produces the same result. If A’s response is wrong but
the MACs verify, A must have forged a MAC since they
include the data, position, and epoch counter, and no two
pieces of data are ever given the same position and epoch
counter. Moreover, because ΠOb has access to a trusted
epoch counter via Fepc, it can properly verify that the data
has the correct epoch counter, even after crashes. Thus,
if S1 accepts an incorrect response with non-negligible
probability, we can simulate A to forge a MAC with
non-negligible probability. Hence H1 is computationally
indistinguishable from H0.
Note that the MACs are only used to check that A pro-
vided correct data. If the storage server is assumed to be
honest, this will always be the case and we can eliminate
the MACs entirely (and also H0 and H1 become identical).
Hybrid H2 replaces all data blocks provided to A with
valid encryptions of random data and MACs on those
encryptions. It otherwise passes on requests, including
the location and timing of reads and writes. S2 contin-
ues to furnish responses to the proxy’s queries using its
internal ORAM with the original data, checking MACs
according to the same scheme as in H1. S2 then output’s
A’s transcript. As all data is encrypted, the only differ-
ence between H1 and H2 is the contents of the ciphertexts,
and by assumption the encryption scheme is semantically
secure. This means H1 and H2 must be computationally
indistinguishable.
Hybrid H3 replaces all data requests toA with properly-
formatted requests for randomly chosen data.
When S3 receives a location log for a read batch, it logs
an encryption of random (unrelated) data with A. When
S3 receives the read instruction for a read batch, it first
selects a random set of dummy paths of the batch size. It
then requestsA perform the proper parallel read operation
for that dummy data. If A replies with the data and the
MACs verify, S3 performs the actual reads on its separate
ORAM with real data and returns the real data to the
proxy.
When S3 is notified of the end of an epoch and given
the associated write batch, it determines which physical
blocks to write using Ring ORAM’s deterministic write
sequence based on the total number of operations (both
reads and writes) in an epoch. It then performs proper
parallel writes of new encryptions of dummy data to each
of those locations. If A replied with confirmed writes, S3
performs the originally-specified operations on its sepa-
rate ORAM and confirms success to the proxy.
Finally, if S3 receives a request to handle a proxy crash at
epoch ce and batch cb, it queries A as per the crash recov-
ery protocol for that epoch and batch. When A provides
valid (MAC-verifying) read path logs for any batches this
epoch, S3 provides the associated logs to the proxy. When
the proxy issues redo read requests, S3 issues the same re-
quests it did the first time to A for the associated batches.
Because S3 did not crash, it is able to retain which paths
were read without having to store them explicitly. In is
possible that the last read batch requested during recovery
corresponds to a read that was never executed, in which
case S3 generates a new random read batch and executes
that instead. If A responds correctly, S3 responds to the
proxy’s requests.
By Lemma 1, the physical operations needed to process
all real requests in a given epoch sequentially form an
identical distribution to the sequential accesses needed to
process the random requests chosen by S3. By Lemma 2,
applying the parallelization process relies only on the
sequential physical access pattern, meaning it can be ap-
plied the same way to S3’s random operations as to the
real operations provided by the proxy. This means that the
operations S3 requests of A are identically distributed to
those the proxy requests of S3 when there are no crashes.
When a crash occurs, the recovery procedure is guar-
anteed to reread all previously-read data, and any future
reads must have independently random paths. This is be-
cause S3 does not even generate random paths to read
until the read request is issued, by which point the persis-
tent batch counter cb is updated. So if a crash does occur,
it will redo any previous reads and future operations are
treated as regular read/write batches with the same (inde-
pendent) distribution. Since these are the only difference
between H2 and H3, the two must produce identical dis-
tributions.
Hybrid H4 now interacts with the ideal functionality and
no longer maintains its own internal ORAM copy, only
the data necessary to perform actions on A’s, including
the new MAC and encryption keys. The only data S3 was
using to compute requests forA was the timing of batches
and crash recoveries, and the epoch and batch counters
during recovery. As FOb explicitly provides all of that
information, S4 is able to provide A with an identical
view. Note that on crash recovery, this identical view
requires completing a crash-recover epoch, which S4 can
do by creating an appropriate number of read and write
operations as it would in H3. This means that H3 and H4
are identically distributed.
Thus we see that H0 corresponds to the real world, H4
corresponds to the ideal world, and each sequential pair
of (Hi,Hi+1) produce computationally indistinguishable
transcripts. Thus it must be the case that H0 and H4 form
computationally indistinguishable transcripts, so ΠOb re-
alizes FOb.
